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Abstract
Transition has entailed the introduction of policies to stimulate product mar-
ket competition, to establish eﬀective corporate governance and to harden
enterprise budget constraints. How do these policies interact? Are they sub-
stitute policy instruments or does one policy reinforce the eﬀect of another?
Although early endogenous growth models predicted a negative relationship
between competition and innovation, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999)
showed that this could be reversed if agency considerations were introduced.
In their model competition acts as an incentive mechanism to reduce man-
agerial slack, which produces the additional prediction that competition and
corporate governance are substitutable. But in a proﬁt-maximizing framework
in which incumbent ﬁrms innovate to escape competition, there will be com-
plementarity between increased product market competition and governance
and between competition and hard budget constraints (Aghion and Howitt
2002). We use the EBRD-World Bank Enterprise survey of over 3,000 ﬁrms
in 25 transition countries to test for interaction eﬀects between policies. We
ﬁnd that competition and hard budget constraints are complementary. We
also ﬁnd that competitive pressure (a) enhances the performance of old ﬁrms,
which is suggestive of a role of agency eﬀects and hence of policy substitutabil-
ity and (b) enhances the performance of new ﬁrms, which is consistent with
complementarity. Finally, the evidence points to the prevalence of ﬁnancing
constraints facing new ﬁrms.
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11 Introduction
Transition in post-socialist economies has entailed the introduction of multiple struc-
tural reforms. The aim of reforms has been to improve contract enforcement and
property rights protection and to establish eﬀective corporate governance through
both privatization and fostering the formation of new private ﬁrms. Reforms have
sought to increase competition and factor mobility. They have been directed at
hardening ﬁrms’ budget constraints by cutting oﬀ support from the state, enacting
new bankruptcy codes and reforming the ﬁnancial system. How do these diﬀerent
types of reform interact? Does success with one reform alleviate the need to press
forward with others or are the beneﬁts from one reform only available once reforms
have been implemented elsewhere?
Policies implemented in transition have assumed that competition is good for
performance. Yet prevailing endogenous growth models predicted a negative im-
pact of competition on innovation. In the mid 1990s, interest reemerged in pinning
down the theoretical and empirical relationships between product market compe-
tition and productivity growth (i.e. dynamic economic performance rather than
static eﬃciency). Although partly motivated by the big stylized fact about compe-
tition and innovation in the two economic systems, the subsequent theoretical and
empirical work developed largely outside the speciﬁc context of transition. Mean-
while pro-competition policies were being implemented alongside other reforms in
the transition economies.
Our objective in this paper is to extract from the recent theoretical literature
insights directly relevant to transition. In particular, we seek to clarify the economic
mechanisms through which policies to increase competition may interact with other
reform policies. We focus on the interplay between competition and the hardening
of enterprise budget constraints, between competition and the governance of ﬁrms
and between competition and credit rationing. To test the predictions of the models
we use ﬁrm-level data from more than 3,000 ﬁrms in 25 transition countries collected
in the EBRD’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) survey
implemented in 1999.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the relevance of endoge-
nous growth models to the context of transition economies and summarizes previous
results relevant to our question. Section 3 provides the theoretical underpinning for
the paper by presenting the models and using them to analyze how the interplay
between product market competition and corporate governance, soft budget con-
straints and credit rationing aﬀects innovation. Section 4 describes the BEEPS
data and the measures of competition, ‘governance’, soft budget constraints and
innovation available in the data-set. Section 5 sets out the econometric testing
strategy and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
22 Motivation
It is useful to think of the dynamics of improved performance in the enterprise sector
in transition economies as being driven by two processes. In the ﬁrst process, old
enterprises that existed under the planned economy are restructured. Unconditional
state support for the survival of the enterprise and its work-force is removed. To
survive, old enterprises have to take restructuring actions such as hiving oﬀ activi-
ties and reducing over-manning. Markets have to be found for their output. This is
referred to as reactive restructuring. In a second process, enterprises make invest-
ments and innovate. So-called ‘strategic restructuring’ (innovation) is undertaken
by some old enterprises and also by new ﬁrms. Aggregate performance of the en-
terprise sector improves as a result of shrinkage or closure of the weakest old ﬁrms
and through successful innovation by both old and new ﬁrms.
In a transition economy, an example of an innovation is the introduction of a
product that is new to the market or the modiﬁcation of an existing one. When
the reform process began, gaps in the provision of goods and services were revealed
and an important step in understanding growth in transition is to understand what
has determined the speed with which such niches have been ﬁlled. The introduc-
tion of technologies and forms of organization new to the economy such as quality
control systems are also ‘innovations’. Such innovations fall into the category of
‘strategic restructuring’ in the transition literature (Carlin, Van Reenen and Wolfe
1995, Grosfeld and Roland 1997). As we shall see, the tools of endogenous growth
theory oﬀer a way of modelling the incentives and constraints on managers to invest
resources and eﬀort in identifying and ﬁlling niches.
It is only recently that the endogenous growth literature has focused on the eﬀects
of corporate governance on innovation and growth. For example in Romer (1990) or
Aghion and Howitt (1992), the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms that innovate has no eﬀect
on the equilibrium amount of R&D. The models assume perfect capital markets, so
that the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. Equilibrium R&D is determined by the
total net present value of monopoly rents from innovating. And the eﬀect of product
market competition in these models is unambiguously negative.
This prediction is in contrast to the empirical evidence on competition and
growth in Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. (1999), who documented a positive
impact of competition on productivity growth and the number of innovations for
UK ﬁrms. More recently, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt (2002) have
reported a robust inverse-U relationship between product market competition and
patenting activity by UK ﬁrms. The prediction is also contradicted by ﬁndings
from transition economies reported in Carlin, Fries, Schaﬀer and Seabright (2001)
(henceforth, CFSS) and in Grosfeld and Tressel (2001).
CFSS use the EBRD’s BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Survey)survey data (i.e. the same data as used in this paper) and report
that in explaining the real growth of sales of ﬁrms, two measures of competition
were signiﬁcant: both the number of competitors and an ‘elasticity of demand’ in-
dicator. They found that competition at the level of the ﬁrm has a robust inﬂuence
on sales growth and that the eﬀect is non-monotonic. Firms facing one to three
3competitors grew 10-12% faster than either those with no competitors or those with
more than three. Controlling for the number of competitors, it was also the case that
ﬁrms reporting less elastic demand grew faster. Sales growth was faster in new ﬁrms
and in ﬁrms that had innovated in the sense of undertaking strategic restructuring
actions. The likelihood of a ﬁrm introducing new products or modifying products
was found to be positively aﬀected by the presence both some market power and
pressure from foreign competitors or customers. Softer budget constraints and state
ownership made such ‘strategic restructuring’ actions less likely.
A ﬁrst attempt to develop a growth model consistent with the empirical ﬁndings
of a positive impact of competition on innovation proceeded by introducing corpo-
rate governance considerations. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1999) — henceforth
ADR — introduced Hart (1983)’s idea of ‘competition as an incentive scheme’ into
the Schumpeterian growth paradigm. The ADR model features two types of ﬁrms,
proﬁt-maximizing ones and non-proﬁt maximizing ones with ‘satisﬁcing’ managers.
The objective function of satisﬁcing managers is to minimize eﬀort (or delay inno-
vations) subject to remaining in business, in order for them to preserve their private
beneﬁts of control. An example of such a ﬁrm is one that relies heavily on dispersed
outside equity ﬁnance1, so that the monetary returns to managerial innovative eﬀort
would mainly accrue to outside ﬁnanciers.
For the standard Schumpeterian reason, increased product market competition
would discourage innovations in an economy that is mainly composed of proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms. However, the eﬀect is reversed in an economy that is mainly
composed of ﬁrms with satisﬁcing managers. The reason is that the higher the de-
gree of product market competition, the lower the ﬂow of rents to ﬁrms that have just
innovated, and therefore the sooner a ﬁrm needs to make the next innovation in or-
der to remain solvent. This eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that a higher frequency of
innovations puts upward pressure on wages as the average ﬁrm in the economy com-
petes with more advanced ﬁrms for labour. Hence more product market competition
stimulates innovation and growth, all the more when managers do not respond much
to monetary incentives. Since the model accommodates both proﬁt-maximizing and
satisﬁcing ﬁrms, it appears to be particularly well suited to the analysis of transition
economies. New ﬁrms are more likely to be proﬁt-maximizing and state-owned or
newly privatized ones are more likely to have managers who behave as satisﬁcers
and are confronted with the need to undertake restructuring in order to survive.
Another prediction of this model is that the positive eﬀects of product market
competition on innovation tend to be reduced in ﬁrms with higher debt-pressure:
the reason is simply that higher debt pressure already raises the required frequency
of innovation for satisﬁcing managers, thereby substituting for product market com-
petition in inducing innovations. Thus, overall, the ADR model predicts that better
corporate governance, as measured by higher managerial stakes in the ﬁrm’s mone-
tary proﬁts or by a higher debt-asset ratio and higher enforcement power by cred-
itors, tends to reduce the impact of product market competition on growth. These
results stem directly from the modelling of competition as an incentive scheme.
1See Jensen-Meckling (1976).
4This latter prediction has been recently challenged by Grosfeld and Tressel (2001)
with data from transition. Grosfeld and Tressel use a panel data set covering
200 ﬁrms listed on the Warsaw Stock Market during the period 1990-1998 and re-
port that more product market competition (PMC) raises total factor productivity
(TFP)growth.2 They also report that PMC raises TFP growth and that the ef-
fect is stronger for ﬁrms with both concentrated and relatively dispersed ownership.
The ﬁnding that the eﬀect of PMC is enhanced for ﬁrms with highly concentrated
ownership suggests a complementarity between corporate governance and product
market competition.
Instead of introducing non-proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms, the basic Schumpeterian
model is extended by allowing incumbent ﬁrms to innovate (Aghion, Harris and
Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers(2001) and Aghion and Howitt
(2002)) For convenience, we refer to this model as AHHV. Firms innovate in order to
reduce production costs, and they do it ‘step-by-step’, in the sense that a laggard ﬁrm
in any industry must ﬁrst catch up with the technological leader before becoming
itself a leader in the future. In this alternative framework, innovation incentives
depend not so much upon post-innovation rents per se, but more upon the diﬀerence
between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents (the latter were equal to zero in the
basic model where all innovations were made by outsiders). In this case, more PMC
may end up fostering innovations and growth as it may reduce a ﬁrm’s pre-innovation
rents by more than it reduces its post-innovation rents. In other words, competition
may increase the incremental proﬁts from innovating, and thereby encourage R&D
investments aimed at ‘escaping competition’. Moreover, it will do so to a larger
extent when managers have stronger monetary incentives created for example by
higher residual claims on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts and/or if they face a higher expected
cost of default (i.e. a harder budget constraint) if they fail to innovate ahead of
their competitors. In earlier endogenous growth models, innovation was done only
by outside ﬁrms or by the most backward ones. The central insight in the AHHV
model is that incumbent ﬁrms — not only outsiders and laggards — innovate.
In this paper we test for interaction eﬀects between competition and the hardness
of ﬁrms’ budget constraints. The mechanism suggested by ADR would propose that
a positive impact of competition on innovation stems from the increased threat to
survival of managers in non-proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. If this threat is enhanced
by a hardening of enterprise budget constraints, then the impact of competition
should be less. Using the BEEPS data, we can test the interaction between budget
hardness and competition because we are able to use the broad cross-country nature
of the data to construct instruments for the hardness of the budget constraint at
enterprise level. Contrary to the predictions of ADR, we ﬁnd that competition and
hard budget constraints are complementary. We also ﬁnd that competitive pressure
induces restructuring in old ﬁrms, which is consistent with ADR, and in new ﬁrms,
which is not. The latter ﬁnding is more consistent with the models of competition
and innovation in AHHV.
2A table comparing the data sources, deﬁnitions and results of Grosfeld and Tressel and CFSS
is provided in the appendix, Table A1.
53 Theoretical background
3.1 A model of competition and restructuring for old ﬁrms
This subsection outlines the ADR model (see ADR (1997), (1999)). By introducing
ﬁrms with agency problems, this model is well-suited to the analysis of old ﬁrms in
transition economies. Suppose a consumption good, taken as numeraire, is produced
using a continuum of mass N of intermediate goods, according to the Dixit-Stiglitz
technology:
y =
Z N
0
Aix
α
i di, 0 < α < 1,
where xi denotes the amount of intermediate good i used by the ﬁnal good sector
and Ai is a productivity parameter that measures the quality of intermediate input
i. The important feature of this formulation is that ﬁnal goods producers can
substitute between the diﬀerent intermediate goods available. If the intermediate
goods are closer substitutes, then we can say that competition between intermediate
goods producers is more intense.
Each intermediate good producer enjoys monopoly power in its own sector, and
faces two types of decisions: (i) an output decision for given technology A, which will
determine the equilibrium proﬁt ﬂow of the ﬁrm for a given technology parameter,
and (ii) a decision of when to adopt the leading-edge technology. Intermediate inputs
are produced with labour according to a one-for-one technology, and at any point in
time an intermediate input producer competes for labour with the most advanced
ﬁrms. As a result, in steady-state equilibrium wages will grow over time at a rate
equal to the rate of technological progress. Now, assuming that intermediate good
production involves positive ﬁxed costs, an intermediate goods producer that never
innovates will see its gross proﬁt ﬂow shrink, and eventually fall below the level that
would allow it to cover its ﬁxed costs. Namely, one can show (ADR (1997)) that
the equilibrium net proﬁt ﬂow of an intermediate ﬁrm with technological vintage Aτ
(where for all s, As = A0egs) at time t > τ, is of the form:
πt,τ = ψ(u,α)e
gt,
where: u = t − τ is the age the ﬁrm’s technology at date t and:
(i) ψ(0,α) > 0;
(ii) ψu < 0, ψα < 0;
(iii) ψ(u,α) < 0 for u suﬃciently large.
The ﬁrst condition says that the net proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm that has just innovated
is positive. The second condition says that this proﬁt decreases with age and also
with α, which measures the substitutability between intermediate inputs. As noted
above, we take this as a measure of product market competition. The third condition
6says that the net proﬁt ﬂow becomes negative when the ﬁrm has not innovated for
too long.
Assuming that technological adoption requires the hiring of f skilled workers at
the current wage for one unit of time, one can show that a value maximizing ﬁrm
will choose to innovate every T ∗ periods, where:
T
∗ = argmax
T
[
−ωf +
R T
0 ψ(u,α)e−(r−g)udu
1 − e−(r−g)T ],
with ω denoting the productivity-adjusted wage rate and r is the discount rate.
One can show that T ∗ increases with α — in other words higher product market
competition discourages innovations by value-maximizing ﬁrms as it reduces the
monopoly rents from innovating. This is the Schumpeterian eﬀect of PMC.
Consider now a ﬁrm with a ‘satisﬁcing’ manager who does not respond directly
to monetary incentives — her primary objective is to preserve her private beneﬁts
of remaining in control. She knows in advance that the monetary returns from her
innovative eﬀorts will mostly accrue to the state or to the new outside ﬁnanciers.
If private beneﬁts of control are suﬃciently large and the manager ﬁnds it costly
to innovate (e.g an innovation involves ﬁring workers and spending time becoming
acquainted with the new technical knowledge) then the manager will typically delay
the next innovation up to reaching the survival limits of the ﬁrm, i.e the point at
which the ﬁrm will not be able to sustain survival.
The equilibrium frequency of innovations will then satisfy:
Z T
0
ψ(u,α)e
−(r−g)udu = ωfe
−(r−g)T,
where the left hand side of this expression is the accumulated net proﬁt of a ﬁrm
that has innovated T periods ago (but evaluated as of the innovation date) and
the right hand side shows the cost of making the next innovation (again evaluated
as of the date of the last innovation). An increase in PMC as measured by α
shifts the accumulated proﬁt curve downward and therefore reduces the equilibrium
frequency e T deﬁned by this equation. In other words, by reducing the amount of
cash accumulated by an intermediate ﬁrm that has innovated, PMC forces that
ﬁrm to innovate sooner in order to avoid going bankrupt. Thus competition should
induce restructuring by state-owned ﬁrms or by ﬁrms with dispersed ownership —
i.e. in ﬁrms with the weakest governance. Governance is stronger, the closer are the
objectives of the manager to those of the owner(s) of the ﬁrm.
An additional prediction of this model is that debt-ﬁnancing and PMC should be
substitute instruments in inducing innovations and growth. To see this, let d denote
the ﬂow debt repayment obligation contracted by an intermediate ﬁrm, and suppose
again that the manager is ‘satisﬁcing’. The equilibrium frequency of innovations will
now satisfy: Z T
0
[ψ(u,α) − (r − g)d]e
−(r−g)udu = ωfe
−(r−g)T,
so that a higher d will have the same eﬀect as that of increasing α, i.e. of increasing
PMC, namely to shift the accumulated proﬁt curve downward and therefore to
7increase the equilibrium frequency of innovations e T. And for d suﬃciently large, the
eﬀect of PMC on innovation will completely disappear. Similarly, the higher the
manager’s claims to monetary proﬁts (i.e. the stronger is governance in our terms),
the lower her response to increased PMC. The reason is that she will increasingly
react like a value-maximizing ﬁrm. It is this particular prediction regarding the
substitutability between ‘governance’ and PMC that has been challenged recently
by the ﬁndings of Grosfeld and Tressel (2001).
3.2 A model of competition and innovation for new ﬁrms
We turn now to show how a new model of competition and innovation3 can help
to explain why an increase in product market competition can raise productivity
growth even for ﬁrms with strong governance (e.g. proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms with
no agency problems). It is safe to assume that newly formed ﬁrms in transition
economies are more strongly motivated by monetary incentives than is the case for
old ﬁrms. Using this model, we shall see that once we introduce outside investors or
bankruptcy costs, the impact of increased competition on innovation is reinforced
by stronger governance or harder budget constraints.
3.2.1 Consumers
Suppose that ﬁnal output, y, is produced using input services, xi, according to the
following production function
lny =
Z 1
0
lnxidi. (1)
Each intermediate goods producing sector i is assumed to be duopolistic with
respect to both production and research activities, with ﬁnal output generated ac-
cording to
xi = v(xAi,xBi)
where v is homogeneous of degree one and symmetric in its two arguments. A special
case is:
xi = (x
α
Ai + x
α
Bi)
1
α (2)
where a higher α ∈ (0,1] reﬂects a higher degree of substitutability between the two
inputs in industry i.
The log-preference assumption made in (1) implies that in equilibrium individu-
als spend the same amount on each basket xi. We normalize this common amount to
unity by using expenditure as the numeraire for the prices pAi and pBi at each date.
Thus the representative household chooses each xAi and xBi to maximize v(xAi,xBi)
subject to the budget constraint: pAixAi + pBixBi = 1.
In the special case where v(xAi,xBi) = (xα
Ai + xα
Bi)
1
α, the demand functions facing
the two ﬁrms in industry i are:
3The following presentation of AHHV draws on Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997), Aghion,
Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) and Aghion and Howitt (2002)
8xAi =
p
1
a−1
Ai
p
α
a−1
Ai + p
α
a−1
Bi
and xBi =
p
1
a−1
Bi
p
α
a−1
Ai + p
α
a−1
Bi
. (3)
3.2.2 Technology levels, R&D and innovations
Each ﬁrm produces using labour as the only input,4 according to a constant-returns
production function, and takes the wage rate as given. Thus the unit costs of pro-
duction cA and cB of the two ﬁrms in an industry are independent of the quantities
produced. Now, let k denote the technology level of duopoly ﬁrm j in some industry
i; that is, one unit of labor currently employed by ﬁrm j generates an output ﬂow
equal to:
Aj = γ
kj, j = A,B, (4)
where γ > 1 is a parameter that measures the size of a leading-edge innovation;
(equivalently, it takes γ−kj units of labour for ﬁrm j to produce one unit of inter-
mediate good). An industry is then fully characterized by a pair of integers (l,m),
where l is the leader’s technology and mis the technology gap of the leader over the
follower. We deﬁne πm (respectively π−m) to be the equilibrium proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm
m steps ahead of (respectively behind) its rival.5
For expositional simplicity we shall concentrate here on the simple case where
knowledge spillovers between leader and follower are such that the maximum sus-
tainable gap is m = 1. That is, if a ﬁrm is one step ahead and it innovates the
follower will automatically copy the leader’s previous technology and so the leader
will remain only one step ahead. Therefore, in that case, given that proﬁtability
is only dependent on the gap between leader and follower, no innovation will be
undertaken by the leader. At any point in time there will therefore be two types
of intermediate sectors in the economy: sectors where there is no technological gap
between the ﬁrms (i.e. m = 0) so that ﬁrms are ‘neck and neck’, and leader-follower
sectors where one ﬁrm is leading the other in the same industry, with a technology
gap of one step (i.e. m = 1).
We denote by ψ(n) = 1
2βn2 the R&D cost (in units of labour) of a leader (resp.
follower) ﬁrm moving one technological step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate of
n6. Let nm denote the research intensity put up by each ﬁrm in an industry with
4In Aghion et al. (2001) we argue that the model can be easily extended to the case where
ﬁrms use both capital and labor as inputs according to a CES production technology of the form:
xj = (αk
σ−1
σ
j + (1 − α)(Ajlj)
σ−1
σ )
σ
σ−1,
where Aj measured labor productivity in ﬁrm j and is multiplied by γ > 1 each time ﬁrm j
innovates.
5The above logarithmic technology along with the cost structure c(x) = x.γ−k implies that the
proﬁt in the industry depends only on the gap m between the leader and follower, and not on
absolute levels of technology.
6In Aghion et al (2001) we analyze a diﬀerent model in which the laggard in an industry with
technological gap m catches up immediately with the technological leader whenever she innovates,
thereby reducing her unit labor cost by γ−m. However, that formulation tends to exaggerate the
9technological gap m, and let n−m denote the R&D intensity of the follower in such
an industry.
3.2.3 Product-market competition
Boone (2001) makes the convincing argument that any parameter that positively
aﬀects the proﬁtability of having lower costs or better quality products than other
ﬁrms, is a suitable measure of product market competition. The intuition for this
relies on the following selection eﬀect of market competition: an increase in product
market competition increases the relative market share of ﬁrms with lower costs
or better products. Thus one possible (inverse) measure of competition would be
the proﬁt ﬂow of ‘neck-and-neck’ ﬁrms, π0. The lower is π0, the higher is the proﬁt
increment (π1−π0) from innovation. A higher π0 will typically reﬂect higher collusion
among otherwise similar ﬁrms in the same sector, so that a lower π0 implies higher
PMC.
Another potential ‘measure’ of competition that is also consistent with Boone’s
theoretical standpoint, is the elasticity of substitution parameter α in the case7:
v(xAi,xBi) = (x
α
Ai + x
α
Bi)
1
α .
If the two inputs cannot be substituted, then α = 0 and there is no competition
between the ﬁrms; if α = 1, then the goods are perfect substitutes and competition
is at its maximum (Bertrand competition between producers of undiﬀerentiated
goods). It can also be shown that in this model α corresponds to the standard
measures of competition such as the elasticity of substitution in demand between
the two rivals’ output in any industry. It is also an inverse function of the price-cost
margin. In Section 4, we shall discuss how these interpretations of α relate to the
empirical measures of competition that we use.
3.2.4 Bellman equations
Let Vm denote the steady state value of being currently a leader (or follower if m < 0)
in an industry with technology gap m, and let w denote the wage rate, which we
take as given assuming an inﬁnitely elastic supply of labour. We then have the
following Bellman equations:
rVm = πm + nm(Vm+1 − Vm) + n−m(Vm−1 − Vm) − wβ(nm)
2/2;
rV−m = π−m + nm(V−m−1 − V−m) + n−m(V−m+1 − V−m) − wβ(n−m)
2/2;
rV0 = π0 + n0(V1 − V0) + n0(V−1 − V0) − wβ(n0)
2/2;
In words, the annuity value rVm of currently being a technological leader in an in-
dustry with gap m at date t equals the current proﬁt ﬂow πm minus the current
R&D cost (wβnm
2/2)dt, plus the discounted expected capital gain nm(Vm+1 − Vm)
importance of the ‘escape competition’ eﬀect and to downplay the Schumpeterian eﬀect of PMC.
7See Aghion et al. (2001).
10from making an innovation and thereby moving one further step ahead of the fol-
lower, minus the discounted expected capital loss n−m(Vm−1 −Vm) from having the
follower catch up by one step with the leader. The equation for the annuity value
of a follower is similarly explained. Finally, in the Bellman equation for a neck-and-
neck ﬁrm, note that if each ﬁrm only takes into account its own cost of R&D, in
symmetric Nash equilibrium both R&D eﬀorts are equal.
Now, using the fact that each ﬁrm chooses its own R&D eﬀort to maximize its
current value, i.e to maximize the RHS of the corresponding Bellman equation, we
obtain the ﬁrst order conditions:
βwnm = Vm+1 − Vm;
βwn−m = V−(m−1) − V−m;
βwn0 = V1 − V0.
We shall focus on the special case where the maximum technological gap between
leaders and followers is m = 1, assuming for simplicity that w = β = 18. Then, given
the spillover assumption introduced above, a technological leader has no incentive
to invest in R&D (n1 = 0), and the above Bellman equations become:
rV1 = π1 + n−1(V0 − V1)
rV−1 = π−1 + n−1(V0 − V−1) − (n−1)
2/2
rV0 = π0 + n0(V1 − V0) + n0(V−1 − V0) − (n0)
2/2

  
  
(5)
with corresponding ﬁrst order conditions:
n−1 = V0 − V−1
n0 = V1 − V0



(6)
Thus, for example, the annuity value rV1 of being a leader is the current ﬂow of
proﬁt π1 minus the expected capital loss per unit of time from being caught up with
by the laggard. The expected loss is the loss in value V1 − V0 that will occur if the
laggard innovates, multiplied by the ﬂow probability n−1 of the laggard innovating.
3.2.5 Equilibrium R&D intensities and product market competition
Equations (5) and (6) can be solved for n−1 and n0. Eliminating the V ’s between
these equations yields the reduced form research equations:
(n0)2
2
+ rn0 − (π1 − π0) = 0 (7)
(n−1)2
2
+ (r + n0)n−1 − (π0 − π−1) −
(n0)2
2
= 0. (8)
8We thus take the wage rate as given, with the implicit assumption of an inﬁnitely elastic supply
of labor at wage w = 1. See Aghion et. al (1997) for a discussion of the case where the supply of
labor is inelastic.
11This system is recursive, as we can solve the ﬁrst quadratic equation for n0, and then
given n0 solve the second quadratic equation for n−1. We obtain the ﬂow probabilities
(or hazard rates) of respectively neck-and-neck and follower ﬁrms innovating:
n0 = −r +
p
r2 + 2(π1 − π0) (9)
n−1 = −(r + n0) +
q
(r + n0)2 + n2
0 + 2(π0 − π−1). (10)
Combining (9) and (10) yields the alternative expression:
n−1 = −(r + n0) +
q
r2 + (n0)
2 + 2(π1 − π−1). (11)
Here, we shall focus on the eﬀects on the innovation probability of an increase
in product market competition as represented by a reduction in π0 leaving π−1 and
π1 unchanged. (The analysis and results in the remaining part of this section can
be replicated using the elasticity parameter α as an alternative way to parameterize
PMC). We immediately see that n0 (the probability of the neck and neck ﬁrm
innovating) increases whereas n−1 (the probability of the laggard innovating) can
be shown to fall.9
The latter eﬀect (on n−1) is the basic Schumpeterian eﬀect that results from
reducing the rents that can be captured by a follower who succeeds in catching-up
with its rival by innovating. The former eﬀect (on n0) is what we refer to as an
‘escape competition eﬀect’, namely that more competition induces neck-and-neck
ﬁrms to innovate in order to escape competition, as the incremental value of getting
ahead is increased with higher PMC. Thus, if we were to treat the fractions of ‘neck
and neck’ and ‘leader-follower’ sectors in the economy as an exogenous parameter,
we would get the conclusion that the higher the fraction of neck-and-neck sectors
in the economy, the more positive the eﬀect of product market competition on the
average innovation rate.
3.2.6 Competition and the average innovation rate
An increase in product market competition will have an ambiguous eﬀect on the
steady-state aggregate innovation rate because it will induce more frequent innova-
tions in currently ‘neck-and-neck’ sectors and slower innovations in currently ‘leader-
follower’ sectors. The overall eﬀect on the average innovation rate and on average
productivity growth will depend on the steady-state fraction of each kind of sector.
9From (9):
∂n0
∂π0
= −
1
p
r2 + 2(π1 − π0)
< 0
this and (11):
∂n−1
∂π0
=
∂n0
∂π0

−1 +
n0 q
r2 + (n0)
2 + 2(π1 − π−1)

 > 0
12More formally, let µ1 (resp. µ0) denote the steady-state fraction of ‘leader-
follower’ (resp. neck-and-neck) industries. During any unit time interval, µ1n−1
leader-follower sectors become neck-and-neck as the laggard catches up with the
leader, and 2µ0n0 neck-and-neck sectors become leader-follower as one neck-and-
neck ﬁrm acquires a lead. In steady state, the two must be equal:
µ1n−1 = 2µ0n0.
This, together with the fact that:
µ1 + µ0 = 1,
implies that the average ﬂow of innovations is:
I = µ02n0 + µ1n−1 = 2µ1n−1 =
4n0n−1
2n0 + n−1
. (12)
We then obtain an inverted U relationship between PMC and the average inno-
vation rate. To see this, note that in the steady state distribution:
µ0 =
n−1
n−1 + 2n0
and µ1 =
2n0
n−1 + 2n0
.
In the limit when there is no competition (π0 = π1), (9) implies that n0 = 0, so
that in the steady state all industries are ‘neck-and-neck’ (µ0 = 1), whereas when
there is the maximum competition (π0 = π−1), (9) and (11) imply that n0 > n−1,
so that the overall rate of innovation in neck-and-neck sectors is more than twice
that in the leader-follower sectors and as a result the fraction µ0 of neck-and-neck
industries in the steady state is less than 1/3.
Thus, at low levels of PMC, most sectors will be neck and neck so that the escape
competition eﬀect dominates on average, whereas at high levels of PMC most sectors
will be ‘leader-follower’ and therefore the Schumpeterian eﬀect of PMC on laggard’s
R&D investments dominates on average. This in turn implies that an increase in
PMC will have a positive eﬀect on innovation at low levels of PMC and a negative
eﬀect on innovation at high levels of PMC.
3.2.7 The interplay between policies
In this subsection we explore the interplay between product market competition and
corporate governance, hard budget constraints and credit rationing. Corporate gov-
ernance is measured by managerial claims to monetary proﬁts. The ADR model,
where competition enhances growth because it reduces managerial slack in inno-
vating ﬁrms, unambiguously predicts that higher managerial claims on monetary
proﬁts or higher debt pressure tend to reduce the positive impact of PMC on inno-
vation and growth. However in this subsection we show that these conclusions can
be reversed in the step-by-step innovation model where higher managerial claims to
monetary proﬁts and higher exposure to bankruptcy costs both reinforce the ‘escape
competition’ eﬀect of PMC on innovation.
13Managerial claims to monetary proﬁts Suppose that managers need outside
ﬁnance in order to set themselves up, and that they choose outside equity ﬁnancing,
which involves the outside investor receiving a ﬁxed share 1−σ of monetary revenues
for that purpose, with the ﬁrm’s managers receiving the share σ. Thus, under outside
equity ﬁnancing, the Bellman equations for equilibrium R&D investments, become:
rV1 = σπ1 + n−1(V0 − V1);
rV0 = σπ0 + n0(V1 − V0) + n0(V−1 − V0) − n
2
0/2;
rV−1 = σπ−1 + n−1(V0 − V−1) − (n−1)
2/2.
By analogy with the previous subsection, we immediately get:
n0 = −r +
p
r2 + 2σ(π1 − π0). (13)
A ﬁrst remark is that n0, the probability that a ‘neck-and-neck’ ﬁrm innovates,
reacts positively to both an increase in product market competition as measured by
a reduction in π0, and to an improvement in corporate governance as measured by
an increase in σ. Now, to analyze the interaction between PMC and σ, a natural
next step would be to compute and sign the cross-derivative
∂2n0
∂π0∂σ. Unfortunately,
the presence of a square root term on the RHS of (13), which reﬂects the concavity of
n0 with respect to π0 and σ, suﬃces to make this sign ambiguous in general. A more
promising way to capture the complementarity between residual claim and product
market competition is to look at the sign of the compensated cross derivative
(
∂2n0
∂π0∂σ
)
comp.
We deﬁne this in the following way: start from a given level of n0; then consider
an increase in σ together with a compensating change — an increase — in π0 so as
to leave n0 unchanged; (
∂2n0
∂π0∂σ)comp is then equal to the variation in the derivative
∂n0
∂π0 along the way. Now, one can easily show that (
∂2n0
∂π0∂σ)comp < 0. In other words
the positive eﬀect of PMC on R&D incentives (i.e. the negative of
∂n0
∂π0) is reinforced
by an increase in the manager’s share: there is complementarity between PMC and
corporate governance as measured by the residual claim of ﬁrms’ managers.
To see this, note that a compensated increase in σ that leaves n0 constant will
also leave
δ = r
2 + 2σ(π1 − π0),
constant by equation (13). Our claim then follows from the fact that:
∂n0
∂π0
= −
σ
√
δ
, (14)
which obviously becomes more negative since δ remains constant and σ is increased.
14Competition and hard-budget constraints To formalize the interplay between
competition and the exposure to bankruptcy costs, we consider the following variant
of the basic one-step model: (1) neck-and-neck proﬁt ﬂows, e π0, are random, i.i.d over
time and uniformly distributed over the interval [π0,π0+1]; (2) π−1 ≡ 0;π1 constant
with π1 >> π0+1; (3) ﬁrms ﬁnance their investments through debt ﬁnancing, which
we deﬁne here as involving a ﬁxed ﬂow repayment obligation D, and a ﬂow default
cost f incurred per unit of time by the ﬁrm whenever e π0 < D10.
Consider ﬁrst the case where exit costs are negligible and where D ∈ (π0,π0+1);
then, the Bellman equations for equilibrium R&D investments, can be expressed as:
rV1 = π1 − D + n−1(V0 − V1);
rV0 = ψ(π0,D,f) + n0(V1 − V0) + n0(V−1 − V0) − n
2
0/2,
rV−1 = −f + n−1(V0 − V−1) − (n−1)
2/2.
where
ψ(π0,D,f) =
Z π0+1
D
(u − D)du − f
Z D
π0
du,
is the expected ﬂow utility of a manager in a ‘neck-and-neck’ industry, net of the
expected veriﬁcation costs. From these Bellman equations and the corresponding
ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium neck-
and-neck ﬁrm’s R&D:
n0 = −r +
p
r2 + 2(π1 − D − ψ) = −r +
√
δ, (15)
where we re-express ψ as:
ψ =
1
2
(π0 + 1 − D)
2 − f(D − π0).
Hence:
∂n0
∂π0
= −(π0 + 1 − D + f)/
√
δ < 0. (16)
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase in the default cost f, which we interpret
as a hardening of the ﬁrm’s budget constraint, together with a reduction in product
market competition, i.e an increase in π0, so as to maintain the innovation rate n0
constant. From equation (15), this should leave
δ
1
2 = n0 + r
constant, which in turn from equation (16) implies immediately that the slope (−
∂n0
∂π0)
should decrease (i.e increase in absolute value terms). In other words, the higher the
default cost f the more an increase in product market competition will increase the
expected default cost incurred by neck-and-neck ﬁrms, and therefore the stronger
their incentive to innovate in order to escape competition. Thus, unlike the ADR
model outlined in the previous subsection, this model predicts complementarity
between PMC and the hardness of ﬁrms’ budget constraints.
10This formulation is inspired from the costly state veriﬁcation literature (e.g Townsend (1979),
Gale-Hellwig (1985)) on debt-ﬁnancing, in which ﬁrms’ revenues are assumed to be unveriﬁable by
outside investors, unless they incur a ﬂow veriﬁcation cost f. For simplicity, we abstract in this
section from ﬁrms’ choice over the optimal ﬁnancial contract.
15Competition and credit rationing So far, we have assumed that R&D costs are
non-monetary. Now suppose that these costs are monetary and that ﬁrms are credit-
constrained to the point where they can only rely on current proﬁts to ﬁnance their
R&D investments. More formally, if pm (resp. p−m) denotes the ﬂow probability of
innovation by a leader (respectively a follower in an industry with technological gap
m), we have:
pm = min(nm,
√
2πm),
where nm is the innovation rate of an unconstrained ﬁrm, since the ﬁnancial con-
straint imposes:
ψ(pm) =
1
2
p
2
m ≤ πm.
We shall again focus attention on the one-step case m ≤ 1, and to better concentrate
on R&D investments by neck-and-neck ﬁrms, we shall also assume that π−1 = 0 ,
but that there is still a positive ﬂow probability h of a laggard ﬁrm catching up with
the leader. By ﬁrst order conditions, we have11:
n0 = V1 − V0
and
p−1 = h,
whereas
p0 = min(n0,
√
2π0).
Note that the ‘constrained’ innovation rate p0 becomes a non-monotonic function of
market competition as measured by a reduction in π0 : too much competition kills
innovation as it eliminates the retained earnings necessary for a neck-and-neck ﬁrm
to innovate. On the other hand it encourages innovations whenever n0 >
√
2π0, and
it does so to a larger extent than before. Indeed V0 goes down by more than in the
absence of credit-constraints when PMC increases, since a reduction in π0 reduces
not only current proﬁts but also the ability of neck-and-neck ﬁrms to become leaders
in the future. This in turn implies that product market competition will have a
stronger positive eﬀect on innovation at low initial levels of competition when the
ﬁnancial constraint for neck-and-neck ﬁrms is not binding, but that at high levels of
competition a further increase in competition will also have a more negative eﬀect
on the aggregate innovation rate since the Schumpeterian eﬀect of PMC on ‘follower’
ﬁrms in ‘leader-follower’ sectors is reinforced by the negative eﬀect of a reduction in
proﬁts on innovation by neck and neck ﬁrms.
11The Bellman equations for the V ’s now become:
rV1 = π1 + h(V0 − V1)
rV−1 = π−1 + h(V0 − V−1)
rV0 = π0 + p0(V1 − V0) + p0(V−1 − V0) − min{(n0)2/2,π0}.

   
   
(17)
164 Competition and innovation in transition: con-
cepts and data
As we shall see, for both substantive and econometric reasons, transition provides a
rich testing ground for the theories outlined in section 3. We begin with the concept
of innovation. When applying the models of section 3 to advanced economies, a
measure of the probability of a ﬁrm innovating is its patenting activity (see for
example Aghion et al. (2002)). However, patenting will be of much less relevance
to ﬁrms in a transition (or other catching-up) economy. As argued in section 2, in
a transition economy, an example of an innovation is the introduction of a product
that is new to the market or the modiﬁcation of an existing one. The BEEPS survey
provides us with data on the innovations managers introduced in the three years to
1999. This can be interpreted in terms of the hazard rate of innovating used in the
models.
The change of regime in transition economies also prompted managers to take
survival-oriented actions such as labour-shedding and plant closures, which have
been referred to as ‘reactive restructuring’. The incentive for managers to take such
actions was their interest in the survival of their enterprise. This motivation is
closer to the idea of the satisﬁcing manager who brings forward an innovation so
as to maintain her private beneﬁts of control as explained in the ADR model, than
of the proﬁt maximizing manager innovating to escape competition in the AHHV
model.
In addition to identifying the kinds of ‘innovation’ taking place in transition, the
transition literature emphasizes the diﬀerence between managerial incentives in old
and new ﬁrms. Firms newly established in the post-reform period are entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and ﬁt more closely the kind of ﬁrm modelled in the AHHV model or the proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms in ADR: i.e. ﬁrms with strong monetary incentives for managers.12
By contrast, old ﬁrms were established in an economy in which agency problems
were enormous. The introduction of product market competition, the withdrawal of
subsidies from ﬁrms and privatization programmes changed the incentives and the
constraints of managers in old ﬁrms. Nevertheless, old ﬁrms are more likely than
new ones to resemble those in the ADR model for which monetary incentives for
managers are relatively weak.
The BEEPS data-set comprises a sample of 3,300 ﬁrms from 25 countries with
a roughly equally split between new and old ﬁrms. New ﬁrms are deﬁned as those
that report that they do not have a state-owned predecessor. Amongst the old ﬁrms,
there are about twice as many privatized as state ﬁrms. Most ﬁrms in the sample
are small — with less than 200 employees; one-tenth have more than 500 employees.
On average, new ﬁrms are smaller than old ones. The survey collected data on the
reported average growth of sales in real terms over the three years to 1999. The
patterns for growth and restructuring have been reported in detail in CFSS (2001)
12Cross-country evidence is beginning to accumulate in support of the importance of the new
ﬁrm sector in generating growth in transition economies. Berkowitz and DeJong (2002) summarize
the evidence and report new ﬁndings that variations in regional entrepreneurial activity in Russia
are closely related to subsequent variations in regional growth rates.
17and can be summarized as follows. The average sales growth was positive for new
ﬁrms and negative for old ﬁrms. All ﬁrm types have been active — but old ﬁrms
do more reactive restructuring, as measured by the closure of a plant or substantial
labour shedding. Controlling for size and sector, new ﬁrms are more likely to have
introduced new products and opened a new plant.
To use the hypotheses suggested by the models in order to test for the interplay
between product market competition and the other policies, we need measures of
product market competition, governance and budget softness. In the BEEPS survey,
ﬁrms were asked a series of questions about their competitive environment. A direct
measure of PMC is provided by answers to the question of how many competitors
the ﬁrm faces in the market for its main product. Managers could choose ‘none’,
‘between one and three’ and ‘more than three’. A second question asked the manager
to assess what would happen to the ﬁrm’s sales if it were to put up its price by 10%
in real terms and its competitors were to leave their price unchanged. Managers
could answer on a scale from ‘all customers would switch away from the ﬁrm’ to
‘customers would continue to buy as before’. Thirdly, managers were asked to
estimate the ﬁrm’s price-cost margin. Each of these measures can be related to
the concept of PMC used in the models. In ADR, PMC was parameterized by
the degree α of substitutability between intermediate goods. In AHHV, PMC was
measured by the proﬁt ﬂow of neck and neck ﬁrms (a lower πo corresponding to a
higher level of PMC). An increase in the number of competitors faced by the ﬁrm
entails a fall in its pre-innovation proﬁts relative to post-innovation proﬁts. Equally,
a measure of the way a ﬁrm believes its competitors would react to a change in its
price provides a measure of product market competition consistent with the models.
Finally, the price-cost margin is an inverse measure of PMC to the extent that it
captures monopoly rents.
As reported in Carlin and Seabright (2001), the three measures of competition are
correlated for the sample as a whole.13 When we compare the extent of competition
faced by each ﬁrm type, the following results emerge: state ﬁrms are least likely to
face many competitors and new private ﬁrms are least likely to face none; private
ﬁrms face more elastic demand than do state ﬁrms (CFSS).
Considerable attention has been given to the problem of soft budget constraints
in transition economics. A softer budget constraint means that the threat of ﬁrm fail-
ure or bankruptcy is reduced because a poorly-performing ﬁrm will be rescued with
external resources, typically by the state. Soft budget constraints were endemic in
the socialist economies prior to the start of transition. Although the subsidy regime
was tightened as part of the reform package, budget softness has persisted through
other means, especially through the condoning of tax arrears by governments at the
central, regional or local level (Schaﬀer 1998), or via arrears to utilities. From the
BEEPS survey responses, we take the existence of tax arrears to central and local
government as a proxy for the presence of soft budget constraints. 40% of old ﬁrms
reported tax arrears, as compared with 26% of new ﬁrms. There was considerable
variation across countries with tax arrears lower in Central and Eastern European
13The group of ﬁrms where the measures line up least well is state ﬁrms — speciﬁcally, the
average proﬁt margin was lowest in the state ﬁrms that faced between one and three competitors.
18countries as compared with CIS countries.
5 Testing the interplay between PMC, soft bud-
gets and governance
5.1 Empirical strategy
In this paper, we extend the CFSS study to test for interactions between policies.
Although the BEEPS data has no true time series dimension and lacks detailed
ownership information, its attraction is twofold: the richness of the measures of
PMC, innovation and soft budget constraints and the presence of ﬁrm-level data
from 25 countries. It is very diﬃcult to investigate the role of soft budget constraints
in growth. If poor performance in a ﬁrm is observed in association with a soft
budget constraint, this cannot be interpreted as telling us whether an environment
of budgetary softness depresses innovation and growth. It only tells us that poorly
performing ﬁrms are bailed out.
We make use of methodology developed in CFSS to deal with the endogeneity
of the soft budget constraint measure. The idea is to use the cross-country varia-
tion in the BEEPS data to provide the instruments for the soft budget constraint.
As argued in CFSS, the soft budget constraint environment faced by ﬁrms varies
across countries. Poor performance by a ﬁrm in one country may be less likely to
generate tax arrears than if it operated in another country. The interaction of coun-
try dummies and competition variables is used to provide instruments for the soft
budget constraint faced by the ﬁrm. Since competition is an exogenous determinant
of performance, the regression of the soft budget constraint at the ﬁrm level on
the interaction between the country dummy and PMC (at the ﬁrm level) captures
diﬀerences in how the state in diﬀerent countries reacts to performance. We do not
estimate the soft budget constraint equation explicitly but simply instrument our
soft budget constraint with the country-competition interactions.
The empirical strategy taken in this study is to pool the observations from the
sample and estimate a system of equations — sales growth, innovation, in the sense
of strategic restructuring, and the soft budget constraint. Unfortunately we are
unable to go beyond the CFSS results in relation to reactive restructuring. The
reason is that we lack instruments for the measures of reactive restructuring such
as labour shedding and plant closures.
Sales growth is deﬁned as the log growth of sales in real terms over the three years
previous to the date of the survey (summer 1999). The variable for innovation — in
the sense of new product restructuring — was constructed from the ﬁrst principal
component of responses to four questions on whether, in the preceding three years,
ﬁrms had developed a new product line or upgraded an existing one, opened a new
plant or obtained ISO 9000 accreditation. The resulting index was scaled from zero
(ﬁrm did none of these) to four (ﬁrm engaged in all four activities).
In addition to the two measures of PMC discussed above (number of competi-
tors and ‘elasticity of demand’), further information on the role of competition in
19inducing managers to introduce innovations was gathered. Managers were asked to
assess the importance of pressure from competitors (foreign or domestic) and from
customers in their decision to develop new products or markets. This variable is
used in the ‘innovation’ equation and is referred to as ‘pressure to innovate’.
Controls for ﬁrm size (number of employees), sector (a dummy for services) and
location (a dummy for location in a big city) along with a full set of country dummies
are included in each equation. The structure of the three equation system is shown
in Table 1, where exogenous and endogenous variables are listed. For clarity, the
structure of the soft budget equation is shown, although it is not estimated explicitly.
[Table 1 here]
The ﬁrst step is to test whether ownership can be omitted from the sales growth
equation: from the ADR and AHHV models, our hypothesis is that ownership aﬀects
growth via innovation. From an econometric point of view, the distinction between
old ﬁrms that existed in some form in the pre-transition period and new ﬁrms that
did not is useful because it is unambiguously exogenous. Because of endogeneity
issues related to privatization, we do not try to distinguish between state-owned and
privatized ﬁrms.
Ownership is modelled by a dummy for new ﬁrms (those with no state-owned
predecessor). In the benchmark model structure set out in Table 1, it is omitted from
the sales growth equation but appears as an explanatory variable in the innovation
equation. Whether it belongs directly in the sales growth equation is a test of a
subset of orthogonality conditions of the IV estimation of the equation. The test
results support the exclusion of ownership from the sales equation.14
After estimating the basic equations, we introduced interactions between policies
to test the predictions of the models (see Table 1, where the additional interaction
terms are shown in italics).
1. In the sales growth equation, to test for the complementarity or substitutability
of PMC and ﬁnancial pressure, as measured by a harder budget constraint, we
introduce the interaction between PMC and the soft budget constraint.
2. In the innovation (new product restructuring) equation, we introduce interac-
tions between PMC and ownership.
The system is identiﬁed by the following exclusions: (1) the sales growth equa-
tion excludes ownership, interactions of country with competition and interactions
of ownership with competition; (2) the innovation equation excludes interactions
of country with competition and (3) the soft budget equation excludes ownership
interacted with competition and pressure to innovate variables.
14This is the C-statistic test of a subset of orthogonality conditions (Hayashi 2000, p. 232.),
the subset in this case being the condition that ownership (an instrument) does not appear as a
regressor in the sales growth equation. The p-value of this chi-square statistic is 0.63, meaning
we pass comfortably. The p-value of the Sargan statistic for all orthogonality (overidentifying)
conditions is 0.31, suggesting that the instrumention in the sales growth equation is adequate
overall.
20Equations (1) and (2) were estimated one at a time using GMM. Estimation
equation-by-equation rather than as a system simultaneously was implemented so
that if one equation is misspeciﬁed, the results for the others would not be con-
taminated. The validity of the instruments was tested using the Hansen J-test of
orthogonality restrictions. This is a test of the joint hypothesis that the instruments
are valid (uncorrelated with the error term) and that none of the instruments should
have been included in the set of regressors and were not.
The diagnostic tests for the sales growth equation are broadly reassuring. In
particular, the J-test is passed, which means that the instruments are valid, exoge-
nous and do not belong in the set of regressors. However, although the F-statistics
of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regressions are signiﬁcant, they are rather low
and point to the possibility of a problem of weak instruments. The speciﬁcation of
the innovation equation is less satisfactory as indicated by the diagnostic tests. The
J-test is failed and there are also signs of weakness of the instruments.
5.2 Results
We organize this section according to the empirical predictions of the ADR and
AHHV models. In each case, we ask whether the econometric ﬁndings support or
are consistent with a prediction.
5.2.1 We should observe an inverse-U shaped relationship between PMC
and growth (AHHV; ADR)
The inverse-U is predicted directly by AHHV. ADR predicts a positive relationship
between PMC and growth in ﬁrms with managerial slack and a negative relationship
between PMC and growth in proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. If non-proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
face low PMC and proﬁt-maximizers face high PMC, an inverse U would be expected.
As shown in column 1 of Table 2, there is indeed an inverse U relationship be-
tween the number of competitors and sales growth. Facing one to three competitors
(in the domestic market for the ﬁrm’s main product) raises growth by 6 percentage
points.
[Table 2 here]
From column 1 of Table 2 we also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a soft budget constraint
have lower growth. Innovation, in the sense of new product restructuring, has a
positive impact on growth. Introducing one restructuring measure raises growth by
11-13 percentage points. It is also the case that smaller ﬁrms grow faster than larger
ones.15 The relationship between growth and market power is discussed below.
15A doubling in the size of a ﬁrm translates into a one percentage point increase in the growth
rate of sales: ln2 × −0.016 ≈ 0.01.
215.2.2 AHHV predicts that the inverse U is steeper for ﬁrms with harder
budget constraints: PMC and hard budget constraints are com-
plements. ADR predicts that PMC and hard budget constraints
are substitutes and hence the inverse U will be ﬂatter.
Column 2 of Table 2 repeats the sales growth regression but with the number of
competitors interacted with the soft budget constraint measure. Once the inter-
actions between PMC and soft budgets are introduced, increasing PMC measured
by the number of competitors has a monotonically positive eﬀect on growth and
the soft budget constraint variable becomes insigniﬁcant. But the interaction term
(more than three competitors ∗ soft budget constraint) is negative, large and highly
signiﬁcant. This means that a soft budget constraint reduces growth in ﬁrms in the
most competitive environment (those with more than three competitors). In fact,
facing a soft budget constraint more than oﬀsets the positive impact of facing lots
of competition (more than three competitors). Putting this result another way, if
the ﬁrm is already a monopolist, it is sluggish and adding a soft budget constraint
has no extra eﬀect.
The most striking aspect of these results is that PMC and budget hardness are
clearly complementary as predicted by AHHV. The beneﬁts for growth of more
PMC can be lost entirely if budget constraints are too soft. The interpretation
of this result using the AHHV model is that soft budget constraints weaken the
incentive for ﬁrms to innovate to escape competition.
5.2.3 AHHV predicts that competitive pressure will boost innovation in
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms; ADR predicts that competitive pressure
will boost innovation in ﬁrms with managerial slack.
Table 3 presents the results of the innovation regression. In this regression, we
have interacted each of our measures of competition (number of competitors, mar-
ket power and competitive pressure) with ownership. This generates two sets of
coeﬃcient estimates for the competition measures: one for old ﬁrms and one for
new ﬁrms. We assume that new ﬁrms (i.e. those newly formed in the post-reform
period with no state-owned predecessors) are proﬁt maximizers and that old ﬁrms
are characterized by managerial slack.
Before looking at the interaction eﬀects, we note that new ﬁrms innovate more
than old ones and that ﬁrms facing a hard budget constraint do more innovation.
As shown in Table 3, the pressure of competition boosts innovation by both old
and new ﬁrms. The pressure from foreign competitors seems especially relevant for
old ﬁrms. For the pressure of competition to boost innovation in old ﬁrms suggests
that the ‘innovate to survive’ motive of ADR is characteristic of such ﬁrms. On
the other hand, for competitive pressure to boost innovation in new ﬁrms suggests
that the ‘innovate to escape competition’ motive is relevant for them. These results
are consistent with, although not a direct test of, the idea that PMC can be a
substitute for governance for one group of ﬁrms (where agency problems are rife)
and complementary to governance for another group.
22[Table 3 here]
5.2.4 An extension to AHHV predicts that an increase in PMC will
reduce innovation in the presence of credit rationing and if the
initial level of competition is already high.
The results in Table 2 show that, controlling for the number of competitors, less
elastic demand is associated with higher growth. This suggests the presence of
ﬁnancing constraints. Although the BEEPS survey included managerial responses
to direct questions about credit availability, the endogeneity of perceived credit
constraints means that making use of these answers would face severe econometric
problems.
A common ﬁnding in the empirical literature, however, is that access to the
capital market is especially poor for new ﬁrms, and as noted above, the new/old
distinction is not subject to endogeneity problems. In addition as shown in CFSS,
new ﬁrms face higher levels of product market competition than do old ﬁrms. Given
these priors, we examine the results in Table 3. The estimates for innovation in
Table 3 show that new ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to innovate if they face more
than 3 competitors. The impact of increased market power is to increase innovation
for both old and new ﬁrms, but the eﬀect is more pervasive for the latter. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that higher PMC inhibits innovation by
new ﬁrms because of credit rationing, in line with the predictions of the AHHV
model.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how two models of competition and innovation have
relevance to the analysis of the interaction between policies in transition economies.
We have taken the predictions of the ADR and AHHV models and tested them
using ﬁrm-level data from 25 transition countries. Innovation in this context is
interpreted as the introduction of new products or the modiﬁcation of existing ones.
The exogenously given distinction between ﬁrms that existed under the planned
economy (‘old’) and ﬁrms that were formed in the post-reform period and had no
state-owned predecessors (‘new’) provides us with a way of distinguishing between
ﬁrms characterized by agency problems and those that are better modelled as proﬁt-
maximizing. In the ADR model it is only ﬁrms with agency problems that do more
innovation in response to an increase in product market competition. The AHHV
model demonstrates why new ﬁrms in which monetary incentives are strong may also
respond to an increase in product market competition by devoting more resources
to innovation so as to ‘escape competition’.
We ﬁnd that new ﬁrms are driving the innovation process in the transition
economies and that for such ﬁrms, competitive pressure raises innovation. For old
ﬁrms, competitive pressure — especially from foreign competitors — also raises in-
novation. The former result is therefore in line with the prediction of the AHHV
23model and the latter with the ADR model: both models provide useful insights for
transition countries.
We also ﬁnd that hard budget constraints are necessary if competition is to
raise growth. Soft budget constraints can more than oﬀset the beneﬁts of more
competition. Finally, our results suggest that credit rationing is hampering the
ability of new ﬁrms to innovate.
If conﬁrmed by subsequent research, these results indicate that priority should
be given to eliminating the soft budget constraint environment that persists in many
transition economies. More intense product market competition is not a substitute
for the elimination of soft budget constraints. The importance of policies to facilitate
access of new ﬁrms to external sources of ﬁnance for investment is clear. Policies
to encourage product market competition are likely to have pay-oﬀs both for old
ﬁrms, where they can substitute for eﬀective corporate governance, and for new
ﬁrms, where they spur innovation by increasing the incremental proﬁts that come
from getting ahead of competitors.
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26Table 1. Basic system: showing included and excluded variables 
Additional interactions are shown in italics 
X = included 
 
Variables Sales 
growth 
New 
product 
restructuring
Soft 
budget 
constraint 
      
Exogenous      
Number of competitors (zero; 1-3; >3)   X  X  X 
Market power: predicted response to 10% 
price rise (from 1 = many customers would 
change suppliers to 4 = no change in sales)  
X X  X 
Ownership (old; new)    X  X 
Competition interacted with ownership   X   
Pressure to introduce new product 
(interacted with ownership) 
 X   
Country interacted with competition      X 
      
Country dummies  X  X  X 
Size (log mid-period employment)  X  X  X 
Sector (industry vs. services)  X  X  X 
Location (rural vs. large city)  X  X  X 
      
Endogenous       
{Sales growth interacted with country}      {X} 
Soft budget constraint 
(zero=hard, 1=soft)  
X X   
New product restructuring  X     
Soft budget constraint interacted with 
competition 
X    
 
Note: Sales growth interacted with country is enclosed within braces {} to indicate 
that although the country/government-specific response to a firm’s performance is a 
determinant of the SBC, we do not use this endogenous variable in the estimations 
because we do not estimate an SBC equation explicitly.  
 
Table 2. Sales growth equation with and without interactions with soft budget 
constraint: results using GMM estimation 
 
Number of observations = 2245 
* significant at 10%; ** at  5%; and *** at 1% 
 
 
Variables  Sales growth  Sales growth 
 (1)  (2) 
Exogenous    
No. of competitors (zero is omitted) 
1-3 
>3 
 
0.058** 
0.017 
 
0.097** 
0.103*** 
Market power: predicted response to 10% price rise (Many 
customers would change suppliers is omitted) 
 
Sales would fall a lot 
Sales would fall slightly 
No change in sales  
 
 
 
0.026 
0.079*** 
0.110*** 
 
 
 
0.022 
0.077*** 
0.107*** 
    
Country dummies  Yes  Yes 
Size -0.016***  -0.0145*** 
Sector (services)  0.033  0.040* 
Location (big city)  0.023  0.016 
    
Endogenous    
Soft budget constraint (zero=hard, 1=soft)  
 
-0.187***  -0.065 
New product restructuring  
 
0.112*** 0.125*** 
Number of competitors interacted with soft budget 
constraint 
sbc*(1-3 competitors) 
sbc*(>3 competitors) 
 
 
 
 
-0.097 
-0.206*** 
    
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
χ
2(135)=148.6 
(0.200) 
χ
2=142.3 
(0.274) 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 
  SBC 
  SBC*(1-3 competitors) 
  SBC*(>3 competitors) 
  New product restructuring 
F(132,2080) 
=1.45 (0.001) 
 
 
=1.59 (0.000) 
F(132,2080) 
=1.45 (0.001) 
=3.81 (0.000) 
=1.44 (0.001) 
=1.59 (0.000) 
 
 Table 3. New product restructuring equation –   results using GMM estimation 
 
Number of observations = 2245 
* significant at 10%; ** at  5%; and *** at 1% 
 
Variables  New product 
restructuring 
   
Exogenous  
Interacted with ownership  No. of competitors (zero is omitted) 
 
1-3 
>3 
OLD 
0.016 
0.051 
NEW 
-0.227 
-0.521*** 
Interacted with ownership  Market power: predicted response to 10% price rise 
(many customers would change suppliers is omitted) 
Sales would fall a lot 
Sales would fall slightly 
No change in sales  
OLD 
0.055 
0.112 
0.313*** 
NEW 
-0.038 
0.304*** 
0.249** 
Ownership (old is omitted) 
New 
 
0.736*** 
Interacted with ownership  Pressure to introduce new product: 
 
Domestic pressure 
Foreign pressure 
Customer pressure 
OLD 
0.057 
0.133*** 
0.052* 
NEW 
0.005 
0.053* 
0.114** 
   
Country dummies  Yes 
Size 0.113*** 
Sector (services)  -0.486*** 
Location (big city)  0.137*** 
   
Endogenous    
Soft budget constraint (zero=hard, 1=soft) 
 
-0.575*** 
   
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
χ
2(116)=151.1 
(0.016) 
F-test of instruments (p-value) 
  SBC 
  SBC*(1-3 competitors) 
  SBC*(>3 competitors) 
F(120,2080) 
=1.45 (0.029) 
=3.76 (0.000) 
=1.24 (0.045) Appendix Table A1. Comparison of Grosfeld-Tressel and CFSS results 
 
    Grosfeld & Tressel – 
Poland 
CFSS: 25 transition countries 
Sample  Description Non-financial  listed  Economy-wide  sample; majority of firms have less than 
200 employees 
  Time period  1994 -1998  1996-1999 
  Number of firms  153  2245 
  Type of data  Accounting   Survey  
Variables  Competition  
(firm level) 
Market share (t-1) (NACE 
2); 
Rents (t-1)  
- Number of competitors: none; 1-3; >3 
- Elasticity of demand 
 
 Ownership  Main  shareholder  with 
>20%: foreign, CEO, other 
individual, non-financial, 
bank, NIF, state 
SOE; privatized; new private 
 Ownership   
concentration 
Major shareholder has: > 
50% voting rights = conc.,  
Between 20 and 50%; 
< 20% = disp. 
N/A 
 Soft  budget 
constraint 
No Yes 
Method  Single year - 
panel 
Panel  Single 3-year period 
  OLS / IV  IV (GMM)  OLS/IV/GMM 
 Firm  specific 
effects controlled 
Yes No 
  Endogeneity of  
competition and 
ownership 
controlled 
Yes No 
Specification  Performance 
measure 
TFP growth  Sales per worker 
growth 
 
New product 
restructuring 
 
Reactive 
restructuring 
  Cobb-Douglas /  
Translog 
C-D constant returns  N/A 
Results  Competition  
(firm level) 
Greater market share – 
lower productivity growth 
Higher rents, lower 
productivity growth   
Inverse U-
shaped: Growth 
higher with 1-3 
competitors than 
with either none 
or many; 
Growth higher 
with moderate 
market power 
No. of 
competitors not 
significant. 
Higher market 
power (i.e. lower 
PMC) - more 
innovation.  
More innovation 
when pressure 
from foreign 
competitors and 
customers is 
important reason 
for innovation. 
No. of 
competitors not 
significant. 
Higher market 
power (i.e. lower 
PMC) - less 
restructuring.  
  Ownership  Main shareholder (>20% 
votes): foreign– higher 
productivity growth; CEO, 
bank, NIF  - lower 
productivity growth but if 
CEO has small stake, 
productivity growth is 
higher. 
New firms have 
lower growth. 
State firms 
innovate less. 
State firms do 
more reactive 
restructuring. 
New firms do 
less. 
 Ownership   
concentration 
More dispersed ownership 
and more concentrated 
ownership – higher 
productivity growth 
N/A N/A N/A 
 Complements  / 
substitutes 
Concentrated ownership and 
competition are 
complements 
   
 Soft  budget 
constraint 
N/A  Not significant  Less innovation 
when budget 
constraint is 
softer. 
More reactive 
restructuring 
when budget 
constraint softer. 
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